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Abstract
This article intends to explore the existence of emotional factors in the function-
ing of international relations. Will Japan’s helpful deeds-ODA to China counteract 
or relieve the everlasting hatred caused by Japan’s aggressive war against China? 
This question is examined by discussing the linkage between Japan’s ODA to 
China and Sino-Japanese historical issues from the 1970s to the 1990s. The article 
concludes that a “dual appreciation argument” exists between China and Japan. A 
“dual obligation argument” was also generated, and behind this, a “dual gratitude 
and revenge argument.” With ODA, there is much gratitude from China to Japan, 
but ODA’s political influence has been worn off by historical issues. Facilitating 
historical reconciliation by offering ODA is too much to expect.
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Introduction
It has been said that “agonizing behaviors would leave permanent animosity while 
helpful deeds foster goodwill and friendliness.”1 This is an eternal truth in the hu-
man world. If this saying is applied to Sino-Japanese relations, a question can be 
posed: Will Japan’s helpful deeds-ODA to China counteract or relieve the ever-
lasting hatred caused by Japan’s aggressive war against China? In other words, is 
1 Makoto Iokibe, “Gaiko senryaku no naka no nihon no ODA [Japan’s ODA as a Diplomatic 
Strategy],” Kokusai mondai [International Affairs],  Vol. 517 (April 2003), p. 15.
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the offer of ODA conducive to historical reconciliation between Japan and China? 
What role does ODA play? These questions, which refer to the existence of emo-
tional factors in this international relationship, are discussed in this article.
Japan’s ODA to China began in 1979. Up to 90% of ODA to China is in yen 
loans, and new project loans were announced to end in 2007. Sino-Japanese his-
torical issues have been discussed diplomatically in the last 30 years. This article 
revolves around the emotional issues regarding Japan’s ODA policy towards Chi-
na in chronological sequence. 
1. China’s Renunciation of War Reparations and 
    Japan’s ODA
 
In 1972, China declared it would no longer seek war reparations while negotiating 
the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations. Yet, no government documents indi-
cate the relevance this decision to China’s asking Japan for economic assistance. 
At a press conference on September 30, 1972, a reporter asked Japanese Prime 
Minister Tanaka Kakuei, just returning from visiting China after the Sino-Japanese 
Communiqué, “Are you planning to repay China from now on? (referring to 
China’s giving up on war reparations) by providing cooperation to China’s domes-
tic development?”  Tanaka answered, “This is not a negotiation but a candid dec-
laration on renouncing compensation and war reparations request, therefore Japan 
is going to make a deal with China. Our relation should be based on basic attitude 
and spirit which is valued most by oriental people.”2
In fact, China did not hope for Japan’s financial support at all after renounc-
ing war compensation. After diplomatic relations were normalized, Japan men-
tioned financial assistance several times and suggested that China could take 
advantage of Japan’s government loans. However, China firmly rejected Japan’s 
offer.3 In 1977, an editorial in the People’s Daily stressed China would not accept 
loans from any country.4 It was only in 1979 that China agreed on Japan’s ODA 
after implementing the reform and opening policies. In other words, China never 
considered asking Japan for economic assistance as a reward for renouncing war 
indemnity.
There are several reasons why the Chinese government renounced war repara-
tions.  One is from the point of morality and justice. Premier Zhou Enlai explained 
2 Minoru Takeuchi , Nichu kokou kihon bunkensyu (jyo) [Japan and China Diplomatic Basic 
Document Collection 1] (Sososha Publishing House, 1993), p. 224.
3 Chae-Jin Lee, China and Japan: New Economic Diplomacy (Stanford: Hoover Institution 
Press, 1984), p. 113.
4 People’s Daily, (February 1, 1977); Laura Newby, Sino-Japanese Relations: China’s 
Perspective (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 39.
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this reason during a meeting with the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Miki 
Takeo on April 21, 1972, “It is true that Chinese people are the victims of Japa-
nese militarism, but Japanese people are also actually the victims. We cannot ac-
cept the compensation because it is immoral.” Afterwards, Kunihiro Masao, Miki 
Takeo’s secretary, who also attended the meeting recalled, “We completely failed 
at the level of morality and justice.”5
Historical issues were not put forward throughout the negotiation of Japan’s 
ODA to China at the end of the 1970s. As no existing documents indicate that Ja-
pan’s ODA to China is a policy aimed at solving historical issues. The following 
discussion of relevance can be found between historical issues and  ODA focuses 
on from emotional issues.
2. Emotion’s Influence on Policy Decisions
Japan did feel ashamed and uneasy over the aggressive war and intended to 
counter China’s action of renouncing compensation by supporting China’s eco-
nomic development.  This sentiment began with Japanese policymakers trying to 
convince domestic oppositions of the necessity of offering yen loans to China.6 
Considering the tremendous damage to China caused by the war, political, bu-
reaucratic, financial, and media circles generally held a common perspective that 
Japan should boost economic cooperation with China.7
At a discussion concerning the start of ODA for China, Foreign Minister Okita 
Saburo answered during an interview with the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, “Japanese 
Yen to China has its background and must be carried out with resolution.”8 His 
comments showed Japan’s attitude as positive in response to China’s requests 
under the historical background. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) rebutted voices within the government protesting ODA to China exceed-
ing ODA to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), “We ought to 
cooperate actively with China who gave up war reparations.”9 The view of most 
financial heads was that “because China has given up war compensation, it is 
actually favorable to Japan since we can strengthen the Sino-Japanese financial 
5 Masao Kunihiro , Atarashi nichibei, nichu wo kangaeru [Thoughts on New Japanese -- 
American and Sino-Japanese Relations ] (Iwanami Booklet, 1988), No.110, p. 47.
6 Foreign Minister Ōkita Saburō responded in an interview with the Asahi Shimbun on December 
1, 1979, “Some Japanese do feel obliged to repay China because it gave up war reparations,” 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun (December 2, 1979), p. 4.
7 Greg Story, “Japan's Official Development Assistance to China: A Survey,” Australia-Japan 
Research Centre, Pacific Economic Papers, No. 150, (Australian National University, 1987), pp. 
3-11.
8 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, November 9, 1979, p. 7.
9 Ibid., p. 7.
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relationship under advantageous conditions while offering loan to China.”10 Even 
before normalizing diplomatic relations, people in economic circles and pro-China 
politicians had advocated Sino-Japanese relations. They thought people should be 
grateful of the manner in which China renounced war compensation and wished to 
establish a mature relationship with Japan, and believed Japan contribute toward 
improving Chinese people’s living standards and China’s industrialization.11  The 
media reported Japan’s yen loans and war compensation in a similar way.  An ar-
ticle in the Yomiuri Shimbun (December 4, 1979) stated:
Perhaps Japan is under moral obligation so it made payment to South Asian 
countries as war reparations; China went through colossal damages, never-
theless China decides to give up compensation.  Therefore, the relief pay-
ment to both sides cannot be discussed in the same position.  Japan’s ODA 
to China is actually a package of long term ODA; this special aid method is 
adopted as a kind of favor because of China’s letting go of the past issues 
and renouncement of war reparations.
12
During the 1980s, this sentiment played an active role in supplying a large 
amount of aid to China. On January 9, 1982, Foreign Minister Sakurauchi Yoshio 
responded in an interview with Tokyo Shimbun, “In consideration of the past his-
tory, as it should be, we will grant cooperation in a modest way to help China 
develop its economy.”13  On March 3, 1983, Foreign Minister Abe Shintaro men-
tioned at a Japan House Budget Committee meeting:
Thanks to China’s giving up compensation, the normalization of diplomatic 
relations between Japan and China became possible.  On Japan’s side, we 
need to take historical course hitherto into full consideration and make intro-
spections on this basis.  It is very important that we pledge active coopera-
tion to China’s development.
14
At the China-Japanese Summit on March 24, 1984, Chinese General Secretary 
Hu Yaobang expressed gratitude for Japan’s economic cooperation, and Prime 
10 Asahi Shimbun, September 8, 1979, p. 9. 
11 Tsugio Ibayashi, Zaikai souri sokkin roku: Doko Toshio, Inayama Yoshihiro to no nanan-
enkan [Confidential Record on the Premier of Financial Circle: Seven Years with Toshio Dokō, 
Yoshihiro Inayama] (Shinchosha, 1993), pp. 157-158.
12 Jin Xide, Zhongri guanxi fujiao 30zhounian de sikao [Sino-Japanese Relationship-30 Years 
after the Resumption of Diplomatic Relations] (World Affairs Press, 2002) p. 198.
13 China Monthly Magazine, No. 27 (January 1982), p. 6.
14 Minutes of Budget Committee of the House of Representatives, Ch. 98, No.61, (March 3, 
1983), p. 4.
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Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro responded in a rather interesting way:  “Your appre-
ciation makes me embarrassed. The cooperation with China is our way of reflect-
ing our mistakes of causing China enormous pain and damage, it is a sure thing.”15
Hence, a clear fact can be known that both Chinese and Japanese leaders are 
aware of the linkage between giving up compensation and offering loans.  This 
linkage has a substantial functional political decision making as neither side is 
willing to put their cards on the table. This is the tacit agreement referred to when 
Prime Minister Tanaka mentioned “… the spirit which is valued most by oriental 
people.”
3. ODA and Subsiding of Historical Issues
Was Japan’s ODA to China relevant to the subsiding of Sino-Japanese historical 
issues?  Sino-Japanese historical issues, for instance, the textbook event in July 
1982 and the visit to the Yasukuni Shrine by Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, 
became diplomatic issues not long after the implementation of Japan’s ODA to 
China. Due to the lack of documentation, it is still unclear whether these issues 
subsided because of Japan’s ODA. Nevertheless, many scholars have pointed out 
that this is the case.
For example, Zhao Quansheng mentioned, “Japanese leaders guaranteed China 
with large amounts of loan regardless of their conflict. Although there is no direct 
connection between conflicts and loan, Japan shows its friendly attitude to China 
through government loans in order to smooth the conflict and develop a better re-
lationship with China.16 Some scholars have even pointed out explicitly, “at some 
degree, the Yen loan to China in 1982 is aiming to dispel the disharmony between 
the two countries …. Japanese Yen loan to China is indeed a helping hand in im-
proving Sino-Japanese relations every time it deteriorates.”17
However, in view of the process by which these issues were handled, we can 
see that the Japanese government put forth great effort. On August 8, 1982, just 
after the textbook event, Hashimoto Hiroshi, Director-General of the Informa-
tion and Cultural Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ōsaki Hitoshi, 
Director-General of  the International Academic Bureau of the Ministry of Edu-
cation, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) hurried off to Beijing 
to have a meeting on August 12 with Xiao Xiangqian, Asian Regional Chief of 
15 Diplomatic History Museum of the Japan Foreign Affairs Ministry, Kaijibunsyo 18-04-1029-3.
16 Zhao Quansheng, Nichu kankei to nihon no seiji [Sino-Japanese Relations and Japanese 
Politics ]  (Iwanami Shoten, 1999), p. 236.
17 Takashi Sekiyama, Nichu no keizai kankei wa kou kawatta [Changes in Sino-Japanese 
Economic Relations] (Koubunken Publishing House, 2008), p. 71, 77.
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the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Li Tao, Chief of the Department of Foreign Af-
fairs and Minister of Education, and Wu Xueqian, Vice Minister of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. On August 26, Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa Kiichi expressed 
a unified opinion, and on September 6 Ambassador Katori Yasue added a supple-
mentary explanation to Wu Xueqian’s remarks, after which the situation quieted 
down.  Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro responded that he understood the criti-
cism from China over his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 1985.  He went deeper 
into his explanation at a press conference in late August 1986, “I do not know that 
war criminals are also being worshiped and enshrined in Yasukuni Shrine …. It is 
out of question that people of other countries would consider the prime minister’s 
visit to be an admiration of the class war criminals.” Nakasone even took practical 
actions by deciding not to visit the shrine during the autumn routine grand festival 
in 1985 and on the Day of Defeat in 1986.  Responding to a statement of MEXT 
Minister Fujio Masayuki,18 Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Gotōda Masaharu 
spoke right away, “We are deeply sorry for South Korea and China.”19 Prime Min-
ister Nakasone even had Fujio dismissed from his post.
Indeed, the subsiding of historical issues and offering of ODA do appear to be 
linked. Following the 1982 textbook event is Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko’s first 
visit to China on September 27, when the two countries signed official documents 
regarding a 65 billion yen loan to be made to China that year. Prime Minister Na-
kasone announced the sum of a second loan for 470 billion when he first visited 
China in March 1984.  Nevertheless, no documentation can prove this linkage.
4. Emotional Entanglement ―  “ Country with the 
    Most Debt”
An event in the 1980s indicates the linkage between ODA and the historical is-
sues.  It is obvious that both China and Japan side have their emotions entangled 
over this event. The remarks from Deng Xiaoping which referred to Japan as the 
country with the most debt triggered an intense diplomatic dispute between Japan 
18 Minister of Education Fujio said, “Honoring Yasukuni Shrine is equivalent to Chinese pay-
ing respect to Confucian temple and Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum.” His words were insulting to 
Chinese people. He also said, “The purpose of Nanking Massacre is ‘eliminating resistance,’ it 
does not deserve the criticism …. War means killing people, it is not slaughter according to the 
international law.” Allen S. Whiting, translated by Okabe Tatsumi, Chinese Eyes Japan (Iwanami 
Shoten Bookstore, 2000), p. 100.
19 Official Gotōda Masaharu made the following statement: “Fujio's comments not only for no 
reason caused Japanese people to reflect upon the past war and suspect the resolution on peace 
we state clearly again and again, but also make people doubt Japan's basic diplomatic policy of 
maintaining and strengthening the friendly relations with its neighboring country. I am deeply 
sorry about it.” Nihon Keizai Shimbun (September 9, 1986), p. 2.
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and China.
Deng Xiaoping met with Yano Junya, Chairman of the New Komeito (NK), 
who visited China on June 4, 1987 and asked Japan to bring the Guanghua Dormi-
tory（光華寮）problem to a satisfactory settlement. He also criticized Japan for its 
defense costs exceeding the 1% limit of GNP. Afterwards, Deng Xiaoping made a 
comment in view of Sino-Japanese relations:
In its historical perspective, Japan is supposed to do more for China’s devel-
opment.  Frankly speaking, China is the country that Japan owes the most. 
China did not claim the war compensation.  Japanese people place great im-
portance on reasoning things out, therefore Japan should make more contri-
butions to China’s development.  Frankly speaking, we feel discontented.20
Deng indicated a cause-effect relationship: “Because Japan owes China the most 
Japan should make more contributions to China.” This was the first time a Chinese 
leader made a formal statement on the logic that since China had renounced war 
compensation Japan owed China the most and should therefore contribute more.
Intense disputes between Japan and China occurred over these statements. 
Japan expressed its discontent over Deng’s comment that Japan “should make 
more contributions” by replying, “Don’t you know that we have provided great 
contributions with our economic cooperation?” A leader from Japan’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs said in a speech on June 4,21 indicating that Deng’s criticism was 
unsubstantial: “It seems like Deng Xiaoping has no idea what is happening ( 雲
の上の人 ). It has become a trend that Sino-Japanese relations are really develop-
ing around economy.  We hope that Director Deng would get to know (hear) more 
truth.”22
This comment caused intense criticism in China.  On the evening of June 6, 
the Deputy Director of the Foreign Ministry for the Asian Region, Tang Jiaxuan, 
summoned the temporary Japanese ambassador in Beijing, Yushita Hiroyuki, to 
20 Document 137, a report on a Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs high official’s comments on 
Deng Xiaoping being obvious of what is going on (June 4, 1987); China Division, Asian and 
Oceanian Affairs Bureau, Nichu kankei kihon shiryosyu 1970-1992 [Basic Documents on Sino-
Japanese Relations 1970-1992], (Kazankai Publishing House, 1993), p. 377; Central Party 
Literature Research Center, Deng Xiaoping Nianpu [A chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life] 
(2004), pp. 1192-1193.
21 Prime Minister Nakasone said at a senate meeting in the morning on July 9, 1987, “The state-
ment of the head of Foreign Affairs is actually made by pre-minister Yanagiya at an informal 
symposium.”
22 Asahi Shimbun (June 5, 1987), p. 3. The report by the Nikkei is a slightly different, “The head 
of Foreign Affairs Ministry strongly criticized Deng in the evening of the 4th, ‘Deng has no idea 
what is happening. Has the report reached the higher authorities? People get rigid once they grow 
old,’” Nihon Keizai Shimbun (June 5, June 9, 1987), p. 2.
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express his discontent. China demanded that Japan explain its true intentions and 
take appropriate measures: “The present high official of Japan’s Ministry of For-
eign Affairs is so ignorant of minimum diplomatic etiquette that he openly made a 
vicious attack to our top leader. This is a serious matter which cannot be tolerated 
by the Chinese people and Chinese government.  We have to protest against the 
Japanese government.”23 On June 7, Sun Pinghua, President of the Sino-Japanese 
Friendship Association, criticized the Japanese leader from the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry for making the remarks: “The relation of two countries is not of one beg-
ging for mercy and of one giving in charity.  If the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
thinks that we should keep our mouth closed because China is poor, then I have to 
say this is old Japanese concept.”24
Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to China’s criticism with more 
criticism. They felt that “Japan has the need to speak out.”25 On June 8, Fujita 
Kimio, Director of Asian Foreign Affairs, called the Chinese ambassador to the 
Foreign Ministry. Fujita explained that Japan had no intention to slander Deng and 
they felt sorry if any unpleasantness was caused. His remarks made some sense:
What Director Deng and some Chinese leaders spoke deviates from the ac-
tual conditions of our country and our recognition. Many Japanese citizens 
are surprised by China’s open criticism, therefore people who sincerely hope 
to develop Sino-Japanese relations feel discouraged, which is truth.  The 
current situation goes against the maintenance and development of longtime 
Sino-Japanese relations.26
China was critical again on June 10. The spokesman for the China Foreign Af-
fairs Ministry criticized Japan’s Foreign Affairs Ministry: “The Japanese mass 
media was purposely and wrongly blamed, and as a result, Director Deng’s words 
have been misinterpreted.”27 According to the spokesman, Director Deng politely 
and discreetly gave well-meaning advice aimed at problems between the two 
countries: “Some leader of Japan’s Foreign Affairs Ministry has openly made 
hostile attacks to Director Deng, which not only has hurt the Chinese people’s 
feelings but also brought about abominable impact to the relation between two 
countries.” As a result, in Japan the Japan-China Friendship Association and the 
opposition party also reproached the Japanese government’s way of handling the 
event. The argument finally came to an end when the Vice-Minister for Foreign 
23 Daily China News (June 15, 1987).
24 China Overview Editorial Committee, China Review (Gyosei, 1988), p.137.
25 Asahi Shimbun (June 9, 1987), p. 2.
26 China Review (1988), p. 137.
27 Daily China News (June 15, 1987).
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Affairs Yanagiya Kensuke openly expressed regret and resigned on June 18.
The cause and effect of the two countries’ criticism can be seen by looking at 
the process of their argument, which resembled a chain reaction of repeated im-
pulses.  Both countries showed resistance during their arguments. We can come to 
a conclusion from this chain reaction that both sides had the following opinions:
1. In China people feel that despite Japan’s cruel invasion, China renounced 
compensation. For this, Japan should be grateful. The way Japan handled the 
Guanghua Dormitory problem was dissatisfactory. Therefore, some Chinese 
leaders had revealed their true thoughts when offended.
2. Japan feels that China should be thankful for the economic assistance Japan 
has offered to China year-in and year-out. This feeling was made known to 
the public by diplomats.
3. Japan and China both had an imaginary feeling of frustration. China was 
conscious of her economic disadvantage compared to Japan. The remarks of 
the Foreign Affairs Ministry leaders were a demonstration of Japanese pa-
ternalism.  Sun Pinghua’s aforementioned comments proved this. Chairman 
Li Xiannian also thought that some Japanese had the idea that if China re-
quires economic aids them must refrain from criticizing Japan.  Li expressed 
his strong discontent, “We do not need economic assistance with strings 
attached.”28  On the other hand, Japan was frustrated because they could not 
tell China exactly what they felt.  Some leaders of Japan’s Foreign Affairs 
Ministry justified their behavior with such statements as, “Be serious about 
what we advocate or oppose, otherwise, we will leave our people with an im-
pression of being too compliant to China, or will even encourage an impos-
ing manner of pre-war nationalism.”29
In November 1989, Deng Xiaoping met with Saito Eishirō, Supreme Consul-
tant, and Kawai Ryōichi, Representative of Japan’s delegation for the China Asso-
ciation on Economy and Trade. Deng said, “We wish Japan could search her heart 
and not be arrogant, while China strives to be stronger and not be self-abased.”30 It 
can be said that China viewed the remarks of the Japanese Foreign Affairs leader 
as an expression of arrogance that stimulated China’s inferior national sense of 
self-esteem.
This event quieted down without conclusion.  However, the chain of mutual 
criticism surfaced again in an emotional way during the discussion of whether to 
28 Ibid.
29 NIKKEI, Vol. 2 (September 14, 1987).
30 Central Party Literature Research Center, Dengxiaoping nianpu [A Chronicle of Deng 
Xiaoping’s Life], pp. 1298-1299.
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terminate ODA to China in the late 1990s.
5. Formal Linkages between Historical Issues and 
    ODA
The Chinese government carried out two nuclear tests in 1995. After the first test 
on May 15, the Japanese government announced a policy to reduce its grant aid to 
China.  After the second test on August 17, the Japanese government principally 
froze grant aid and launched a negative linkage of ODA measures against China.
China condemned Japan’s sanctions by bringing up historical issues. After the 
freezing of grant aid, China’s past emotions resurfaced. Chairman Jiang Zemin 
and other top leaders were having a seminar in memory of the 50th anniversary of 
victory in The War against Japan’s Invasion in the Great Hall of the People when 
they were informed of the news.31
When Japan protested China’s nuclear tests and warned that it would take mea-
sures concerning ODA, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman showed regret.  On 
August 21, he said Japan should have some deep and profound reflections so the 
two countries could keep developing their normal relations.  Nuclear tests and 
financial problems should not be linked together.32 Historical issues between the 
two countries had been used by China to restrain Japan.  After Japan froze grant 
aid, China responded with criticism on August 29, “Instead of having a deep re-
flection on its invasion crime and learning its lesson in earnest, Japan deliberately 
exaggerated on China’s nuclear tests; We have to think deeply into this … what 
is Japan up to politically?”33 From this time on, China integrated historical issues 
into its criticism of Japan.
Three months prior, when Kano Michihiko of Japan’s New Frontier Party vis-
ited China as the leading official of foreign policy, he stated clearly that Japan 
might reconsider some measures of its ODA. In response, Li Shuzheng, Head 
of the CPC International Department stated, “Japan’s financial aid to China is 
relevant to the historical fact that it has invaded China and China gave up war 
reparations.”34  Here again, the linkage between ODA and historical issues, espe-
cially the renouncing of compensation, were brought up.
31 Composed by Tianhuan, Zhanhou zhongri guanxi wenxian ji 1971-1995 [The Literature 
Collection on Postwar Sino-Japanese Relations 1971-1995]  (Chinese Social Science Press, 
1997), p. 941.
32 The Movement Inside and Outside of China, No. 24 (1995).
33 Ibid.
34 Asahi Shimbun (June 27, 1995), p.7; The Movement Inside and Outside of China, No. 19 
(1995).
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Chinese top leaders continued to take a more distinct attitude on this link. 
Premier Li Peng said to Toyoda Shoichiro, who was the leading officer of the 
congressional delegation to China for the Sino-Japanese Economic Association, 
as well as the leader of the Federation of Economic Organization (FEO), “The 
invasion by Japanese militarism has brought China great damage which cannot be 
mentioned in the same breath with Japan’s loan to China.”35  Here, premier Li re-
lated ODA to war damage to criticize Japan’s sanctions.  At a meeting with Prime 
Minister Murayama Tomiichi in New York on October 22, Chairman Jiang Zemin 
said, “China has been extremely tolerant of Japan’s compensation issues while 
we are working on the normalization of diplomatic relations between two coun-
tries.” He also mentioned the renunciation of war compensation to curb Japan’s 
criticism.36
Japan used ODA to launch sanctions against China. Meanwhile, in China a 
bestselling book titled, China, You Can Say NO was published. The book is a 
strong demonstration of Chinese nationalism, and its background was Japan’s 
sanctions against China.
Chinese people’s emotions reflected in this book can be summarized as follows:
1. Chinese people think Japan’s ODA to China is a type of compensation.37
2. Chinese people think it is despicable of Japan to use ODA to demand China 
stop nuclear tests, which is also the most disgusting behavior in international 
politics.  They also hope Japan, who has brought enormous damages to 
China, can appropriately treat the victim – China.38
3. Due to Japan’s ODA sanctions against China, people regret renouncing war 
reparations: “If we had not given up the war reparations, China’s modern-
ization would have been expedited and people would have been better-off. 
Furthermore, it is justifiable that to request Japan provide reparation may 
actually cause them to examine their own conscience as sinners …. If we 
had not given up nor urged, would Japan still easily threaten China to freeze 
the loan? … We plant a tree of tolerance which yields deformed fruits of 
bitterness.”39
4. Chinese people believe Japan’s position is that terminating ODA will restrain 
China’s development.40
35 The Movement Inside and Outside of China, No. 25 (1995).
36 Asahi Shimbun (October 23, 1995), p. 2.
37 Song Qiang, and Zhang Cangcang, No to ieru chugoku [China Can Say No], translated by Mo 
Bangyi (Nikkei News, 1996), pp. 123-124.
38 Ibid., pp. 123-124.
39 Ibid., pp. 195-197, p. 123.
40 Ibid., p. 123.
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6. Over-expecting ODA to Facilitate Historical 
    Reconciliation
“We need to reconsider (which actually meant lessen or terminate) offering ODA 
to countries which resent our visit to Yasukuni Shrine.” This statement made by a 
Japanese politician41 clearly indicates that from 1995 to 2005, historical issues in 
Sino-Japanese relations were associated with Japan’s comments about terminating 
ODA to China. The statement meant that Japan saw China’s response to ODA as 
ungrateful, hence it should be cancelled.  Japan’s emotion led to the idea of ter-
minating ODA. In April 2005, Foreign Affairs Ministers from both countries con-
firmed, after a business negotiation, that Japan would stop providing new project 
yen loans to China before 2008, hoping ODA could begin well and end well.42
In contrast, Chinese leaders and the parties concerned have always been grate-
ful.43  Even when the relations between Japan and China turned sour because of 
Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, Chinese leaders 
expressed appreciation and thanks for Japan’s ODA. Such examples are too nu-
merous to enumerate.
Why dis Japan feel they were not appreciated by China?  According to the pro-
cess of how this question is put forward, the lack of appreciation for Japan’s good 
intentions has nothing to do with whether or not China says “thanks,” but gener-
ates from dissatisfaction over historical issues. This can be understood by compar-
ing two Chinese leaders’ visits to Japan. In November 1998, on Chairman Jiang 
Zemin’s visit, the historical issues he mentioned aroused intense repulsion in Ja-
pan.  This repulsion “was directly related to ODA,” with phrases like, “We need to 
stop the ODA to China who made no comments and expressed no appreciation.”44 
In fact, on the occasion of Jiang Zemin’s visit, China’s gratitude to Japan was 
written into the two countries’ joint declaration for the first time.45
41Speech by Yoshitada Konoike, Minister of State for Special Zones for Structural Reform, Asahi 
Shimbun (September 9, 2003), p. 3.
42 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Affairs Minister Machimura Visited China (Japan and 
China counterparts talks), Ministry of Foreign Affairs website (April 17, 2005) at
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/g_machimura/china05/gaisho_gai.html>
43 Xu Xianfen, Nihon no taichu ODA gaiko: rieki, power, kachi no dainamizumu [Japan’s ODA 
Diplomacy to China: the Dynamism of Interest, Power and Value] (Keiso Shobo, 2011).
44 Makoto Iokibe, “Gaiko senryaku no naka no nihon no ODA [Japan’s ODA as a Diplomatic 
Strategy],” Kokusai mondai [International Affairs], Vol. 517 (April 2003), p. 2.
45 Chairman Jiang Zemin issued a joint declaration on building a friendly and cooperative 
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This is in contrast to Premier Zhu Rongji’s visit in October 2000, years after 
the previous visit, which is hailed as having helped improve the worsening atmo-
sphere between the countries. Two reasons for the positive impact of this visit are:
1. When Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro wished China would have more 
publicity on Japan’s economic assistance, Premier Zhu emphasized that the “Yen 
Loan, free financial aid and technical cooperation have played important roles in 
the modernization of China and are highly praised.  We want thank the Japanese 
government and Japanese people.”  He also said, “So far we haven’t done enough 
promotion, we need to work on that.”46
2. Premier Zhou intentionally avoided historical issues and literally played 
the Erhu [Chinese stringed instrument] in Japan’s NHK hall to make Japanese 
people feel more close, showing his attitude of “no-comment on historical issues.”
Comparing these visits, Japan’s emotions can be described as follows: If China 
were grateful for Japan’s ODA, it would not bring up historical issues so as to 
show consideration for Japan, lest China is not grateful for Japan or at least not so 
much.  Therefore, Japan should stop its ODA to China.
In the first half of the 2000s, Koizumi Junichiro was Prime Minister of Japan. 
During this period, Sino-Japanese relations deteriorated due to Koizumi’s visits to 
the Yasukuni Shrine.47 The trusting relationships between Chinese and Japanese 
leaders collapsed, especially after his third and fourth visits.48
After this trust was lost, relations worsened.  Koizumi handled the situation 
with provocative diplomacy.49 Under these circumstances, Japan’s ODA became 
a source of conflict instead of a tool to improve relations.  The media frequently 
reported that China did not show enough gratitude for ODA.  Meanwhile, the 
Japanese government also started demanding China to enhance publicity about 
ODA.  This demand was brought up explicitly for the first time in a summit talk 
between Japanese Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro and Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji. 
In addition, there are examples of government officials being directly involved 
in the implementation of financial aid complaining and even criticizing China for 
relation dedicated to peace and development between Japan and China, “Japan’s side agrees 
that a stable, open and developing China is of great importance to the peace and development of 
Asian-Pacific region and also of the world. Japan will keep cooperating and supporting China on 
its economic development. China thanks Japan for all the economic operations so far.”
46 Asahi Shimbun (October 9, 2000), p. 3.
47 Six times total: August 13, 2001, April 21, 2002, January 14, 2003, January 1, 2004, October 
17, 2005, and August 15, 2006.
48 Political Department of the Yomiuri Shimbun,  Gaiko wo kenka ni shita otoko [The Man Who 
Fights as a Diplomatic Solution] (Shinchosha Publishing House, 2006).
49 Ibid., pp. 259-260.
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their way of publicizing ODA.  For example, Sugimoto Nobuyuki, Japan’s Gen-
eral Consul in Shanghai, complained in his memoirs about the location of an aid 
program monument and asked China to change it.  He also expressed his strong 
discontent that some of his Japanese staff members were treated differently by the 
Chinese central government administrative officers at the completion ceremony of 
a regional aid program.50 On March 17, 2005, Prime Minister Koizumi asserted at 
a press conference that “China is not one of the countries that candidly appreciates 
ODA,”51 which meant that the emotionalization of Sino-Japanese relations had 
reached its climax.
During the Koizumi period, every time historical issues started to protrude, 
there would be an upsurge of talk about ODA’s termination.  Expectations to reach 
historical reconciliation with China could clearly be sensed Japan.  However, 
when these expectations were not fulfilled, people became anxious. News reports 
mentioning that “ODA’s effect can barely be seen from events such as how Chi-
nese people reacted in regards to Koizumi Junichiro visiting the Yasukuni Shrine 
and how the problem of those refugees at the Shenyang consulate was handled,” 
and some politicians seeking to “reconsider offering ODA to countries which are 
not happy at visiting Yasukuni Shrine” reflect this sentiment.
Although Chinese leaders and parties concerned continuously expressed their 
appreciation of Japan’s financial assistance, Japan aimed to stop ODA because 
Chinese people were not grateful.  The reason Japan thought China was not grate-
ful was in China’s raising of historical issues (i.e. Chinese protests against Koizu-
mi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine). Japan’s logic was that since China is going to 
raise historical questions, China must not be grateful of Japan’s ODA; in that case, 
Japan needs to terminate it.  On the other hand, China should not have mentioned 
any historical issues since it had accepted Japan’s ODA. This logic is based on an 
unrealistic expectation that ODA can prevent historical issues from being brought 
up.
Conclusion
A “dual appreciation argument” exists between China and Japan surrounding his-
torical issues and its relation to ODA. China renounced Japan’s war reparations in 
1972 when Sino-Japanese relations were normalized. China’s tolerance on histori-
cal issues formed a pair relation: “Japan thanks and China is thanked.” On the oth-
er hand, after 1979, Japan began to provide a large amount of financial assistance 
to China. Its magnanimity formed another relation pair, “China thanks and Japan 
50 Nobuyuki Sugimoto, Daichi no houkou [Roar of the Earth]  (PHP Research Center, 2006), p. 
127.
51 Nihon Keizai Shimbun (March 18, 2005), p. 2.
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is thanked.” The coexistence of these two relations generated a “dual obligation 
argument.”
Behind this argument is a “dual gratitude and revenge argument.” China 
renounced war compensation even though it was brutally invaded by Japan, there-
by “conferring benefit” to Japan. On the other hand, Japan has been generously 
offering ODA to China for almost 30 years, hence Japan “conferred benefit” to 
China.  Both countries expect “payback” after “mutual benefit.” Once their expec-
tation of being paid back failed, a hearty dislike to each other’s action of “returning 
ingratitude for kindness” would burst out.52
Between Japan and China, the emotions of “dual appreciation” interlock and 
entangle, which could “easily generate a feeling of reciprocal blame similar to one 
side being ungrateful and treacherous while the other side betraying and turning to 
a traitor.”53 The first half of 2000s was a time when the chain reaction of the two 
countries’ emotional resistance to each other was distorted more and more. Re-
turning to this article’s research questions, it can be concluded that there is much 
gratitude from China to Japan brought by ODA. However, laying all hopes of fa-
cilitating historical reconciliation on the offering of ODA is too much to expect.
Numbers of research and comments have spoken approvingly of the great con-
tribution ODA has made on China’s economic development. Both Chinese and 
Japanese governments mutually acknowledge this fact.  Most importantly, for 
China, there is always “an awareness that we need to be grateful.” On many oc-
casions, when Chinese leaders and parties concerned were brought into contact 
with Japan’s ODA, or when they were “asked to express their gratitude,” or at the 
summit talk when historical issues caused unpleasantness, or when the Chinese 
premier gave a speech at the Japanese Diet during his visit to Japan, gratitude was 
exchanged again and again.  Even ordinary people who have a critical attitude 
toward ODA would not deny that “we ought to thank Japan” when they express 
their opinions online.
We can see the phenomenon that the appreciation between China and Japan 
brought forth by ODA has been neutralized by the resentment caused by histori-
cal issues.54 We can also say that ODA’s political influence has been worn off by 
52 Hiroaki Yokoyama, Hannichi to hanchu [Anti-Japan and Anti-China] (Shueisha Publishing 
House), p. 92.
53 Foreign Affairs Japan, Foreign Affairs Kessaku sen 1922-1999 (ge) [Foreign Affairs 
Masterpiece 1922-1999 Volume 2 ] (Asahi Shimbun Press, 2001), p. 12.
54 Even ordinary people’s appreciation to ODA was distorted because of the involvement of his-
torical issues. For example, at an elementary school’s completion ceremony sponsored by Japan’s 
NGO-Free Financial Aid, the principal made a speech on the school’s construction process, say-
ing, “We needed to thank Japan for its aid.” After that, he said, “We had to hold back our grati-
tude because Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited Yasukuni Shrine the day before.” Zhou 
Hong, Zhang Jun, Zhang Min. Waiyuan zai zhongguo [Foreign Aid in China] (Social Sciences 
Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) Policy towards China
92 The Journal of Contemporary China Studies, Vol.2, No. 1
historical issues.55 The hope that friendly emotions brought forth by offering eco-
nomic aid could help with the heavy task of achieving historical reconciliation is 
very slim. After all, historical reconciliation is inherently a political subject which 
must be studied through a process of investigating facts, memorizing, apologiz-
ing, compensating and taking of responsibilities.56 In the early 2000s, the attempt 
to change the heightened atmosphere of mutual revulsion and resistance between 
China and Japan through ODA therefore seems very feeble.
In spite of this, if a heart-to-heart understanding is important for historical rec-
onciliation, ODA and its good intensions have created gratitude between the two 
countries. This should still be helpful in the process of historical reconciliation.
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